Fairly recently I went on a trip in to the mountains along the Karakorum Highway (KKH), during which I branched off and ventured fairly close to the Line of Control separating Azad Kashmir from Indian Occupied Kashmir (IOK).

 

I could drone on about how I think that much of the Northern Areas should be closed to visitors because they don’t appreciate the natural beauty of the place. They throw their rubbish wherever they feel like doing, and drive off road at the drop of the hat. There’s no concept of care for the environment. Not even in a national park, where I saw not only normal food related rubbish, but a baby’s nappy as well, which I sure the hell didn’t go up there to see because I could have seen that in any city in Pakistan!!! I don’t know if I speak for myself and to myself in saying this, but people should take only memories, and leave only footprints!! You’re supposed to take your rubbish with you!!!!

 

Anyway, I think we’ll skip that stick to military related topics. I was however on an off road trip which was entirely unconnected with the military, but looking around it did get me thinking about how easy or difficult it would be to protect the area. Some of the roads were fairly narrow, the surfaces of them wouldn’t stand up to a large amount of heavy traffic, and the bridges over rivers and streams are limited in the weight of vehicle they can accommodate. The KKH itself is in places badly potholed. There’s a lot of work being done to upgrade, resurface and widen the highway, which means there’s a lot of disruption. Other tracks are being widened and turned into all weather metalled roads. Currently therefore it would be very difficult to move a large amount of men and material around the region.

 

However, even once all these road improvements are made, it has to be asked what it would be possible to move on these roads. I think the usual logistics vehicles would make it along with 4x4 vehicles, but tracked vehicles would never be able to be used on such roads. They would damage the road surface for a start, and their engines may not be able to perform adequately at such altitudes (at times over 4,000m). Some types of vehicles and weapons may never able to use these roads. According to Brian Clougley’s ‘A History of the Pakistan Army – Wars and Insurrections’, (Third Edition, Oxford University Press, 2006; ISBN 0-19-547334-5 – which I strongly recommend you all rush out and buy right now), the Indians claimed that the Pakistan Army moved ballistic missiles into the Deosai Plains High Altitude National Park during the Kargil crisis in 1999. Having been there during this trip, I can tell you right now this is total rubbish. The roads and bridges would never have been able to have withstood vehicles of such weight, and having seen the vehicles in question, they would never have been able to have negotiated some of the mountain turns.

 

I am reliably informed however, that what did happen was that some radar systems were positioned in the park by PAF helicopters because the Deosai Plains are right up against the LoC. In such an environment the importance of helicopters cannot be over emphasised, because it’s the only way you can move men and material around at speed. However, the best helicopter that Pakistan has for this task is the Mil Mi-17 Hip, of which it has a very small number in relation to its needs. There’s only really one high altitude post on the Siachen Glacier where you would need something like the Lama, or its replacement the Ecureuil. There are simply not enough helicopters in the Pakistani military let alone the army, to fulfil the logistics effort in Azad Kashmir and the Northern Areas, and this could possibly have severe implications for the defence of these areas. Considering Pakistan’s perennial financial constraints, this is always likely to be the case.

 

So how can Pakistan’s firepower, transport and logistics capabilities be improved then? I’ve already mentioned that road links are being upgraded to make them negotiable in all weathers. However, tracked, and very heavy/large wheeled vehicles will never be able to use them in any numbers if at all. Everything would have to be carried on smaller wheeled vehicles. Obviously ‘lorried infantry’ is nothing new, as this dates back to the dawn of industrial warfare in WWI, but what about a more flexible class of vehicles? Indeed what about a series of 8x8 vehicles?

 

I’ve never really understood what seems to be an inertia or even violent aversion when it comes to adapting such vehicles in some militaries, and Pakistan seems to be one of them. They’re increasingly common elsewhere, because they’re more rapidly deployable, cheaper to purchase and operate, less complicated and therefore easier to maintain than tracked vehicles, and only slightly less capable over rough ground. The Pakistan Army could avail itself of large numbers of them able to roam from the open badlands of Baluchistan and Sind, to the high altitudes of Azad Kashmir and the Northern Areas. It’s not as if we’re ever going to find any tracked vehicles operating there, so that rules out tanks and self-propelled artillery. Every indirect fire support weapon is therefore currently towed, from the M-198 155mm, downwards to the large calibre mortars, but similar firepower, if not greater, could be delivered in an 8x8 vehicle. Not only this, but direct fire support, and troop mobility could also be vastly improved.

 

The best example of what I speak of is the Stryker or LAV-25 families of 8x8 vehicles currently operated by the U.S military. There are three principal variants I have in mind besides the Stryker’s M1126 Infantry Carrier Vehicle; the Stryker’s M1128 Mobile Gun System, the LAV-25s ‘Dragon Fire’ fully automated mortar system, and the Stryker’s MXXXX 105mm Self Propelled Howitzer variant currently under development. The M1128 is armed with a 105mm tank gun like the Italian B1 Centauro tank destroyer. You’re basically not going to get a higher level of direct firepower delivered from a vehicle based weapon in mountainous regions. The ‘Dragon Fire’ programme hopes to deliver a heavy 120mm mortar which is fully automated in every aspect and able to be fired from its mounted position within the vehicle. An alternative to this system could be the AMOS, (Advanced MOrtar System), currently in use with the Finnish and Swedish armies. The double barrelled 120mm mortar system can place 14 rounds on a target using the ‘multiple rounds simultaneous impact’ capability, and has a maximum rate of fire of 26 rounds a minute. Both these systems can fire rounds out to 10-13km. Admittedly some may be sceptical of the 105mm howitzer, but you’re not going to get a 155mm weapon mounted on an 8x8, or even a 10x10, especially not moving about at these altitudes on these roads. With extended range ammunition and the capability to land multiple rounds on a target using the ‘multiple rounds simultaneous impact’ capability, it would be highly versatile and devastating weapon, even if it is only a 105mm. What I am trying to highlight by mentioning these systems, is that defences need not be static in mountainous terrain, and mobility can be as much part of a weapon’s characteristics as it would be elsewhere. Perhaps not as much as on an open plain, but firepower in mountainous terrain need not be static.

 

I’m also not saying that the U.S is somehow simply going to hand over these systems, (some of which are still in development). Pakistan could equally look to its time tested defence partners China and Turkey, both of which are, if not actively introducing 8x8 vehicles (as is the case with Turkey and its Pars/Leopard family of vehicles), but testing its own family of vehicles (as is the case with China). Buying into these programmes should not be difficult for Pakistan.

 

As ever though, there has to be someone with the vision and will power in decision making circles to push for this change. Pakistan used to operate armoured cars, (and very successfully so), but they somehow went out of fashion, and when it comes to the whole range of heavy armoured cars Pakistan has missed the boat entirely. Money is of course another factor, but how many more wheeled vehicles could be bought for the amount of money spent on tracked vehicles? Numbers are as much an issue as quality in many respects.

 

Pakistan does have a programme in place to replace its motley collection of artillery pieces, and aims to have a largely 155mm range of artillery by the end of the next decade. The current 155mm pieces are the M198 howitzers obtained from the U.S. They’re excellent weapons, but a little heavy nowadays, so if something new is to be purchased, it has to be lighter. A cheaper way of increasing the number of 155mm artillery systems, would be to modify the Chinese Type-59 130mm artillery pieces, but that’s not really the best long term solution on grounds of cost effectiveness, and also quality, (they’re good enough for a short sharp war, but in terms of quality were seemingly built to be disposable, not to last). What this will all result in is anyone’s guess, but I don’t think we’ll be seeing as anything heavy as the South African Denel G5 howitzer, despite the fact it’s a truly formidable weapon. It may perhaps simply be too heavy to be lugged about mountainous roads. That could be said for the G6-52 Extended Range self propelled variant as well, (which would boost the Army’s defensive firepower immeasurably); even though I think it would be at least worth a study.

 

However, somehow I doubt there are many takers in the Pakistan army for a family of 8x8 vehicles. This is a pity because there are highly versatile systems out there that Pakistan would do well to take a closer look at, especially when it comes to boosting its defensive capabilities in the north. It all seems a little exposed at present.

It’s been a long time coming, and many had hoped that the deal would have been signed by now, but the deal for the first three HDW Type-214 submarines for Pakistan has yet to materialise. That may not be so bad, because as I reported in Defense News a while back, the deal is expected to be signed before the end of Pakistan’s financial year, which is in August. It will then be ratified by the German government, which would happen in or just after September.

 

However, speculation is rife that a spanner is being readied to be thrown into the works in favour of the hitherto discounted French ‘submarine formerly known as Marlin’ (SFKAM), but now a member of the Scorpene family. There are malicious rumours doing the rounds that the French have been offering a better deal, (news to me, and also to everyone else I’ve spoken to), and that the SFKAM is somehow back in the running even after the navy has painstakingly evaluated both designs, and chosen the Type-214, (ie the one that actually exists and is in service - because the SFKAM is nothing but a paper submarine which exists on nothing but paper, so can’t actually be evaluated as a direct comparison).

 

The only way this can happen at this late stage, is Mr Ten-Percent, President Asif Ali Zardari himself, (the man who sprung to fame strapping bombs to businessmen’s legs and getting them to hand over the contents of their bank accounts). The last time he was in a position to adversely hamper a defence deal he was Finance Minister, (despite having no education to speak of beyond being a spiv with hardly any redeeming qualities, if any – though he is rumoured to have killed his wife). As Finance Minister he demanded a hefty commission on a deal for some ex-French Air Force Mirage-2000s, (along with his dearly departed wife it has to be said – we can’t leave her out). The deal was consequently scrapped, and to this day the air force officially has no fighter with an operational beyond visual range air-to-air capability. (There is a bit of a riddle in there for the above brain dead, but more will become clear sometime in the future). Anyway, getting back to Zardari he is an all round bad dude with a reputation for unsavoury financial shenanigans. Currently, the French are trying to figure out if he was somehow involved in killing some French technicians working on the Agosta-90B project in 2002, who were blown up coming out of their hotel in Karachi. Apparently, Zardari was a tad annoyed he hadn’t received his full kickback for the deal, and was so short of cash he’d been reduced to rummaging about in the bin outside the local MacDonalds as a result. (Admittedly, I may be wrong about that last bit).

 

However, now that the French are in danger of losing their monopoly in flogging dodgy submarines to Pakistan (see below), and because the next generation Pakistan submarine project may involve around 14 submarines through the life of the programme, the chequebook, and wads of cash in brown paper bags, are back out again. The deal is after all worth billions and billions, so who cares if a few technicians died? It’s not like they can be brought back to life or anything, and as they say: ‘business is business’. That’s callous I know, but I’m not the one throwing cash about trying to elbow my way back into a submarine deal with a paper product, and ignoring the fact that the guy on the receiving end may have had his finger on the button that blew some compatriots to smithereens.

 

Pakistan should never have gone for French submarines in the first place. At the time the decision was made to purchase the Daphne class in the late 1960s, the navy had been told they would have the range to operate out into the Bay of Bengal from Karachi. When it was found that wasn’t the case, and the submarines would only be able to operate in and around the Arabian Sea, the French merely shrugged their shoulders and made some lame excuse about a ‘miscalculation’. They’d captured a client, and that is what counted. In fact there was nothing ever especially brilliant about the Daphne class. Sure, people will point out that PNS Hangor was the first submarine to have sunk an enemy warship in wartime since WWII, and since then only HMS Conqueror has managed to repeat the feat, (Falklands, 1982). However, I would put that down more to the professionalism of the Hangor’s crew, the particular environment in which the engagement took place, and the fact that INS Khukri was fairly old and at a disadvantage with regards systems. We also have to remember that the first torpedo fired failed (even after it passed directly under the keel of its intended target where it should have detonated), and alerted the Indians to Hangor’s presence, nearly leading to her being sunk. It was a close run thing.

 

Instead the navy should have purchased the British Oberon class, which was the best diesel-electric submarine of the entire Cold War by far. I’m not saying that because I’m biased by being British, or because I hate the French. I’m merely saying that because the Oberon class were the best diesel-electric submarines of the entire Cold War by far. Their exploits in the hands of Australian, British, and Canadian crews are stuff of legend. One day, I’ll find out why Pakistan did not purchase them, but I suspect it was on grounds of cost, and because the British government at the time, (as it is now more than ever), was probably rabidly pro-Indian. Admittedly the British, in a fit of insanity, killed their own conventional submarine industry, and their customers were taken by others, not least the Germans with the Type-209 series.

 

The Type-209 was another missed opportunity for Pakistan. Sadly, it wasn’t available at the time when decision was made for the Daphne. Who knows what could have been had it been the case? I can’t find anyone who has a bad thing to say about these submarines, and the design and customer service philosophy of the HDW has been unrivalled. Had Pakistan opted for a Type-209 variant even in the late 1970s, the 1980s or early 1990s instead of the Agosta-70 or Agosta-90B, I think it would have been money well spent. Besides the lethality and very high quality of the product, I have one reason for pushing the German angle, Turkey. Pakistan and Turkey have a fraternal relationship that actually predates the formation of Pakistan if that can be imagined. Having been supported by the Muslims of South Asia, (who sent large quantities of gold and other valuables to support their Turkish brethren), in the struggle that saw the birth of the modern Turkish state, that residual good will was transferred to those behind the Pakistan movement, and to the nation on its birth in 1947.

 

That is not all. With regards submarines, Turkey (having been one of the first nations to recognise the importance of submarines way back in the dying days of the Ottoman Empire just prior to WWI), helped train large numbers of Pakistan’s submariners, and overhauled Pakistan’s first submarine, the Tench class PNS Ghazi. At the time both countries were operating ex-USN, reconditioned submarines, and Pakistan had no overhaul facility. It made sense therefore to foster and maintain a close relationship with Turkey. Pakistan’s selection of French submarines all but killed this relationship. Turkey chose to replace its submarines with the Type-209 class, various variants of which were built in its shipyards, and ‘deep’ co-operation, (operation of similar platforms which allowed inter-meshing of training and operations), ended. HDW was very generous with Turkey and enabled it to build the class in various shipyards under a transfer of technology programme. Had Pakistan opted for the Type-209 as well, it is arguably the case that Pakistan could have established a submarine construction industry under a similar deal prior to the Agosta-90B programme.

 

Bar the Mesma AIP system, and the Subtics combat management system, I don’t see what the big deal is about the Agosta-90B either. It’s basically a modification of the Agosta-70, which is nothing to crow about in itself. The Agosta-90B programme is celebrated because of the industrial capability it brought, not necessarily because it’s a brilliant submarine. I’ve never heard it described as such. A PN officer I spoke to once waxed lyrical about being able to produce the steel and fabricate the pressure hull (bar the pressure domes), and a Turkish industry official I met at IDEAS2008 was very impressed with that fact, but the submarine itself doesn’t seem to have people doing cartwheels. It’s possible to fit the Type-209 with an AIP system anyway (which some operators are doing), so the PN could probably have what it has in the Agosta-90B in a better submarine, the Type-209, if it had really wanted. I say it’s the better submarine because someone who was in the business of supplying submarine batteries for various types of submarines, (not just western), and is familiar with a wide range of them as a result, gave me a run down of the capabilities of various submarines. According to him the Type-209, was simply superb.

 

At this point it may be recalled that the Indian Navy operates the largest of the Type-209 variants, and therefore the Pakistan Navy would be naturally hesitant in operating the same type of submarine if not the same variant. That’s probably true, but Greece and Turkey operate the Type-209, and the guy I spoke to supplies batteries for both. It’s not a problem. The same supplier sang the praises of the Type-214 as well, and he gave a very good insight into some propaganda being used to malign the Type-214, due to the convoluted Greek Type-214 deal. He basically said the problems that had been encountered were nothing but the normal teething troubles of a new design which had been bought straight off paper. The Greeks have a history of this, because they were also the launch customer for the Type-209, (which they also bought straight off paper, and which also had teething troubles). That didn’t stop them from making follow on purchases though, and the current problems will not stop the government in Athens making follow on orders for the Type-214 in future.

 

For decades therefore, the German option has technologically and industrially been the better option for Pakistan, but they consistently went French. Now things are about to change, and the German, Pakistani, Turkish submarine co-operation programme that should have started decades ago, now looks like it is about to finally get off the ground. That is if the SFKAM can be kept out of the picture. I’ve written before, (in Defense News), about how the Pakistani and Turkish defence relationship can be boosted by building and operating the same submarine. The defence co-operation between the two can increase in breadth and depth. Some of Pakistan’s submarines components, modules, or even entire submarines could even be built in Turkey to speed up construction and entry into operational service. Turkey could benefit in having its subs fitted with MSL’s Slimline Towed Array Sonar, which is currently being produced for the Pakistan Navy. The sonar is optimised for warm littoral waters like those found around South Asia, and could work equally well in the Mediterranean. A variant of the Babur cruise missile could even find its way onto Turkish submarines. This is just for starters. It’s a win-win situation for both countries.

 

This can’t happen if the SFKAM suddenly gets chosen. From IDEAS2006 I recall that it has a liquid oxygen-diesel AIP system, as opposed to the ethanol-liquid oxygen Mesma AIP system installed on the Agosta-90B. When I mentioned this to a German trying to flog the Type-214, he started laughing and replied “Well, good luck to them in getting it to work!” Good luck indeed! Opting for a paper submarine over something tried, tested, and in service is rash to say the least. With the delays that have already bedevilled the programme, Pakistan can’t afford anymore, and that would definitely be a certainty if the SFKAM was somehow now selected. There’s too much at stake to go French one more time. Zardari will eventually go, but the navy runs the risk of being lumbered with a white elephant, albeit one that swims, or is supposed to, (it’s still only a paper sub remember).

 

Perhaps the only way to ward this off is to stand outside the local mosque on a Friday with a towel or shawl to collect ‘chanda’/charity for poor old Zardari. I suggest Pakistanis overseas do the same too, and if not the local mosque then at least rattle tins outside the local supermarket/shopping mall. Paying Mr Ten-Percent to keep his claws off may be the only way of saving the deal from further delays. After all, it's not like we can appeal to his patriotism, only his wallet.